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1 The Incomprehensibility of Double Comprehensibility 
     The account given in the last chapter of how free will in a physicalistic universe is possible 
also makes clear (as I have already indicated) that it is wildly implausible.  In order for free 
will (or wisdom) to exist, the control structure of the brain must be such that detailed 
freedom-ascribing personalistic descriptions and explanations of thoughts, perceptions, 
desires, decisions and so on precisely match detailed physicalistic or causal descriptions and 
explanations of these same thoughts, perceptions and so on construed as brain processes, as 
physical processes.1  Even though possible, it is nevertheless little short of the miraculous that 
such incredibly intricate matching should actually occur in the real world.  It cries out for 
explanation and understanding. 
     In other words, the solution as to how it is possible for the human world to exist embedded 
in the physical universe, sketched in the last two chapters, has created a new problem 
(touched on towards the end of chapter six): How can the possible but wildly implausible, all 
but miraculous coexistence of the human and the physical be explained and understood?  And 
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a little more specifically: What explanation can be given for the beautiful and intricate way in 
which the physical and personalistic are dovetailed together, when it comes to human beings, 
so as to make free will a reality in the physical universe? 
     In a sense, the last two chapters do not solve the basic problem; they transform it into the 
problem of explaining and understanding how the world can be such that (some) things can 
be explained and understood in two quite different ways simultaneously, namely: 
personalistically and physically.  If the original mind-body problem concerns the baffling 
incomprehensibility of the mind, of consciousness, the new problem concerns the baffling 
incomprehensibility of people being simultaneously doubly comprehensible  -  
overcomprehensible as one might say.  What is incomprehensible is that there is too much 
comprehensibility in the world, not too little. 
     It is not just our brain processes that are doubly comprehensible; the whole of our world is 
riddled with double comprehensibility.  This is a feature of cultural artefacts such as books, 
pictures, machines, musical scores, speech, drama and dance; it is a feature, in particular, of 
computers, robots and all control devices; it is a feature of the entire biological world; and, in 
a more restricted way, it is even a feature of naturally-occurring inanimate objects and 
phenomena such as stones, waterfalls, clouds and rainbows, in so far as these can be 
described simultaneously in terms of (a) their experiential features, and (b) their physical 
features.2 
     There is at once a baffling problem about the very problem itself.  We have already two 
kinds of explanation and understanding available: our new problem is that of explaining and 
understanding the existence of that which can be explained and understood simultaneously in 
the two available ways.  To what conception of "explanation and understanding" does this 
new problem appeal?  The physical?  The personalistic?  Both?  Or neither?3  If a third kind 
of explanation and understanding is being appealed to, does not this just make the situation 
even more incomprehensible? 
2 Darwin to the Rescue 
     In order to explain the double comprehensibility of human beings, we need to introduce 
two further kinds of explanation, namely purposive explanations (already briefly alluded to in 
the last section of chapter six), and historical explanation.  The apparently incomprehensible 
double comprehensibility of people needs to be understood historically, as something that has 
developed gradually, as life has evolved on earth, from primitive beginnings some four billion 
years ago.  We need to appeal to Darwin's theory of evolution, in order to render intelligible 
the gradual evolution of purposiveness, sentience, consciousness and free will in the physical 
universe.4  As life has evolved, in accordance with the Darwinian mechanisms of 
reproduction, inherited variations, and natural selection, the double comprehensibility 
exhibited by living things has become, gradually and intelligibly, step by small step, more and 
more intricate, extensive and astonishing.  The purposive, and ultimately the personalistic, 
have crept gradually into existence in the physical universe, step by understandable step. 
     In order to be capable of explaining the evolution of sentience, consciousness, free will, 
the purposive and personalistic, in this way, however, neo-Darwinism must be reformulated. 
     First, neo-Darwinism needs to be reinterpreted as a theory designed to explain why two 
kinds of description and explanation, or rather two kinds of intelligible aspects of things, the 
physical and the purposive, dovetail together in the intricate way in which they do, in living 
things.  In doing this, neo-Darwinism presupposes, and exploits, both kinds of description and 
explanation, but in a way which does not compromise the initially purposeless mechanisms of 
evolution (random inherited variations and natural selection) postulated by Darwinian theory. 
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 In presupposing, and being parasitic upon, other modes of explanation (the physical and 
purposive), neo-Darwinism is a theory very different from the theories of physics, Newtonian 
theory, say, or classical electrodynamics. 
     Second, neo-Darwinism needs to be reinterpreted so that it presupposes, and exploits, 
personalistic explanations as well as purposive and physical explanation.  Once it is conceded 
that personalistic explanations cannot be reduced to purposive and physical explanations, it is 
clear that sentience, consciousness and free will cannot be accounted for by a combination of 
physical and purposive explanation and Darwinian theory.  Darwinian theory must be 
reformulated, from the outset, in such a way that it presupposes and exploits personalistic 
explanation (where relevant) in addition to purposive and physical explanations.  This does 
not, however, as we shall see, reduce neo-Darwinism merely to presupposing that which 
needs to be explained. 
     Third, neo-Darwinism needs to be reinterpreted in such a way that the mechanism of 
evolution itself evolves, but in a way which can be explained and understood along traditional 
Darwinian lines.  I have already stressed, on more than one occasion, that the mechanism for 
evolution postulated by Darwinism (inherited variations plus natural selection) may generate 
purposive beings, but is itself blind and purposeless.  This needs to be qualified.  The 
Darwinian mechanism for evolution may begin as purely mechanical, blind and purposeless, 
but as more and more sophisticated purposeful beings evolve, capable of learning and of 
imitation, the very mechanism of Darwinian evolution is itself affected.  Imitation, in 
particular, can modify the Darwinian mechanism for evolution so that it acquires a quasi-
Lamarckian character, acquired characteristics (patterns of activity) being "inherited" by 
imitation.  Gradually, step by understandable step, more and more purposiveness is 
incorporated into the Darwinian mechanisms responsible for evolution until, with human 
beings, with breeding and genetic engineering, the process can become fully purposive, or 
indeed conscious and intentional. 
     This, in outline, is what the rest of this chapter will develop in more detail. 
3 Purposive and Darwinian Explanations 
     Purposive explanations, as I indicated in the last section of chapter six, render intelligible 
the actions of a goal-pursing thing, whether plant, animal, human, thermostat or robot, by 
explaining the actions as being designed to realize the overall goal in the given environment, 
but without appealing in any way to sentience or consciousness.  Purposive explanations are, 
in a sense, degenerate personalistic explanations, devoid of the element of enabling one to 
know what it would be for oneself to be that robot, oak tree, or whatever.  Anything that can 
be explained personalistically can be explained purposively, but not vice versa; and anything 
that can be explained purposively can, in principle (according to experiential physicalism) be 
explained physically, but not vice versa.5  Personalistic explanations are compatible with, but 
are not reducible to, purposive explanations, which in turn are compatible with, but are not 
reducible to, physical explanations. 
     Introducing purposive explanations, in addition to personalistic explanations, might seem 
to make the problem of understanding the wildly improbable dovetailing together of the 
physical and personalistic even worse.  Actually, it achieves the opposite.  Purposive 
explanation is a denuded form of personalistic explanation, half way, as it were, between 
physical and personalistic explanations.  In seeking to render comprehensible the coexistence 
of the personal and physical, it is helpful to consider the easier, but related, problem of 
rendering comprehensible the coexistence of the purposive and physical. 
     Although purposive explanations eschew all reference to inner sensations, experiences or 
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states of consciousness, even when these exist, they may nevertheless refer to a sort of 
degenerate, functionalist version of inner experiences and mental states, such as "belief", 
"decision", "desire", "perception" and so on.  We can say that the thermostat "believes" that 
the temperature of the room is 23oC, the guided rocket "desires" or "intends" to hit its target, 
or "perceives" an incoming rocket and "decides" to take evasive action.  We can declare that 
the chess-playing machine is "aware" of the threat of mate, and is "thinking" about how to 
meet the threat.  All that is being asserted here is that the control-system of the goal-pursuing 
thing has states and processes associated with it that have functional roles corresponding to 
the functional role that real beliefs, decisions, desires etc., have in us, or in other conscious 
beings. 
     All living things are purposive.  This is, indeed, the essential feature of living things.6  
Living things ought to be defined as naturally occurring goal-pursuing beings.  The difference 
between living and non-living things is that living things are purposive in character, non-
living things are not (leaving on one side non-living purposive things, such as thermostats and 
robots, created by us, which are, in any case, a side product of life).7 
     This, then, is the great distinction between the physical and biological sciences: biology, 
unlike the rest of natural science, is concerned with naturally occurring goal-pursuing things.  
And just as purposive explanations cannot be reduced to physical ones, so too biology cannot 
be reduced to chemistry and physics. 
     We now have three distinct kinds of explanation: physical, purposive and personalistic.  
Corresponding to this, we have three kinds of phenomena: the physical, the purposive and the 
personalistic.  The physical is everything; the purposive is a (minute) subset of the physical; 
and the personalistic is a subset of the purposive. 
     We began with a problem about possibility.  How is it possible for the human world, 
imbued with consciousness, free will, meaning and value, to exist embedded in the physical 
universe?  This is the problem I claim to have solved (in outline) in chapters six and seven.  
At once, as I have already indicated, a host of further problems arise about how in fact diverse 
aspects of the human world, and the biological world, fit into the physical universe.  In 
tackling these factual problems about how the physical, purposive and personalistic fit 
together, it is helpful, as I indicated in the last section of chapter six, to distinguish a number 
of further layers of description and explanation: (1) physical (2) molecular (3) chemical (4) 
neurological (5) functional, or in terms of control architecture (6) purposive (7) personalistic. 
     Even a complete solution to the problems of specifying precisely how the physical, the 
purposive and the personalistic fit together or are correlated, or how (1) to (7) are correlated, 
would leave unsolved the mystery alluded to above: How and why has it come to be that the 
physical, purposive and personalistic are correlated in the incredibly intricate, delicate way 
that they are, so that plants and animals can grow and act in the myriad ways in which they do 
in order to live and reproduce, and so that we can have consciousness and free will? 
     It is at this point that we need to invoke the fourth kind of explanation, namely historical 
explanation, and in particular the historical explanation of neo-Darwinism.  In what follows, I 
indicate how neo-Darwinism needs to be reinterpreted so as to be capable, in principle at 
least, of providing explanations of the evolution of purposiveness, sentience, consciousness 
and free will in the natural world.  In addition I indicate, in outline at least, how such a 
reinterpreted theory of evolution may actually succeed in explaining the evolution of these 
and other aspects of the biological and human worlds. 
     I shall tackle these problems of evolution in two stages.  First, I consider the problem of 
explaining the evolution of purposiveness in the physical universe; I then tackle the related, 
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analogous but harder problem of explaining the evolution of the personalistic in the physical 
universe  -  the evolution of sentience, consciousness, imagination, personalistic 
understanding, free will, meaning, language, culture, rationality and value. 
4 Neo-Darwinism and Explaining the Evolution of Purposiveness 
     Before I discuss the evolution of purposiveness, I want first to insert a few words about the 
problem of how it is possible for purposiveness to exist in the physical universe.  So far I 
have just assumed that the solution to this problem is obvious: all one needs to do is to point 
to a simple feedback mechanism, the atom of control, of purposiveness, such as that 
incorporated into the most elementary thermostat  
(see note 56 of the last section of chapter five).  All purposive things, including those that are 
sentient and conscious, are able to pursue goals in their given environment in a way which is 
compatible with physicalism because they incorporate feedback mechanisms (in some cases 
hierarchical/parallel feedback mechanisms of great intricacy and sophistication, as in the 
conscious human brain). 
     This idea, despite its essential simplicity, is one of immense significance.  That this is still 
not always appreciated, even at the dawn of the new millennium, is the outcome, I think, of a 
sort of historical accident.  A thinker (philosopher, psychologist, engineer or biologist) might 
have made his or her reputation in the 19th century through expounding the idea, and spelling 
out its ramifications, its profound significance (for biology, for psychology, for artificial 
intelligence (AI), and for our understanding of ourselves).  Instead the idea was discovered 
and developed in a somewhat scattered, piecemeal fashion, surrounded by a variety of 
misconceptions (from the misconception that purposiveness in biology means vitalism, or a 
return to Aristotelianism, to the misconception that purposiveness in psychology and AI 
means computing, implementing a computer programme).8 
     Once this "purposiveness via feedback and control" solution has been understood, 
however, it is at once clear that, in so far as it applies to life, it means that living things 
embody control systems of quite incredible complexity and sophistication of design.  Life 
may be compatible with the physical: it is also wildly implausible, crying out (like 
consciousness and free will) for explanation and understanding. 
     How, then, can we explain and understand the existence of naturally-occurring purposive 
things, living things, in this purposeless, physicalistic universe  -  the coexistence of the 
purposive and physical?  This is the problem that was solved by Charles Darwin's theory of 
evolution.  The incredibly complex and diverse naturally occurring purposive beings that we 
see around us today are the outcome of a long process of evolution from a primitive 
beginning, evolution occurring as a result, initially at least, of the two purposeless 
mechanisms of (a) random production of inherited variation, and (b) natural selection of the 
variations best able to survive and reproduce.9 
     To get Darwinian evolution off the ground, we must postulate that some four billion years 
ago, there began to occur on earth physical processes that can be regarded as exemplifying 
reproduction, in however primitive and elementary a form.  These processes might involve 
needle-like crystals growing in length and, at intervals, breaking into two as a result of 
buffeting from the environment.  Postulate, next, that inherited variations can occur; in the 
case of the needle-like crystals, though the cross-section character of the needle is ordinarily 
replicated as the needle grows, nevertheless variations can occur, which are then in turn 
replicated along the growing needle's length.  If it is in turn the case that some variations are 
better at growing and reproducing than others, then these are the variations that will tend to be 
selected for by the environment.10   
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     The essential idea is that purposiveness evolves, from meagre beginnings, as a result of the 
application of essentially purposeless mechanisms.  The mechanisms of evolution (initially at 
least) are purposeless.  Evolution itself is purposeless.  But what evolves  -  individual living 
beings  -  are themselves purposive in character. 
     It is worth noting that the theory is only applicable to entities that can be regarded as goal-
pursuing.  This is because the theory requires that the entities in question can legitimately be 
viewed from the standpoint of pursuing the goals of survival and reproductive success.  The 
blind evolutionary mechanisms of random inherited variations and natural selection, working 
together, constitute mechanisms for designing things more and more intricately and diversely 
adapted to pursuing reproductive success in the given environment.  The first mechanism 
blindly produces variations, and the second tends to select those best fitted to survive and 
reproduce.  Evolution generates diversity, including diversity of ways of living and goals; for 
the theory to work as an explanation, however, it is essential that throughout the diversity of 
goals there is a common, basic goal: reproductive success (at least in the sense of 
reproduction of others with genes sufficiently similar to those of the self), survival of self 
being a means to that end.  This must be the common, basic goal of all living things (with the 
possible exception of human beings) if Darwinian theory is to succeed in explaining, in 
rendering intelligible, the evolution of purposiveness in this purposeless physicalistic 
universe.11 
     From the outset, in other words, the character of the common, basic purpose of living 
things plays an essential role in evolution.  Darwinian evolution is only possible  -  or at least 
only makes sense  -  if the basic purpose of life is reproductive success.  This is the only basic 
purpose, one might say, that has a chance of getting a grip, of coming into material existence, 
within a purposeless universe. 
     Above, I have stressed repeatedly the vital role that counterfactual truths play in purposive 
and personalistic explanations, and even in explanations that ascribe free will to the agent.  In 
the case of the Darwinian goals of survival and reproductive success, the role of these 
counterfactual truths is strikingly apparent.  Being able to act appropriately in response to a 
wider and wider range of possible circumstances in the given environment (thus rendering 
more and more counterfactual statements true) is just what a living thing needs to be able to 
do in order to enhance its chances of surviving and reproducing.  
5 Darwin the Exemplary Philosopher 
     Darwin's achievement is profound.  In my view it is ultimately a philosophical one  -  it 
being, indeed, one of the greatest contributions to philosophy.  At the root of his theory is a 
profound, philosophical problem, generated by post-Galilean, post-Newtonian natural 
philosophy, (as almost all really fundamental philosophical problems are).  As I have put it 
above: How can we explain and understand the existence of naturally-occurring purposive 
things in this physicalistic (and therefore ultimately purposeless) universe?12  One is inclined 
to say that Darwin found the only possible solution to the problem: certainly no one has been 
able to think of a rival idea that is even remotely as good.13  The basic idea is extremely 
simple and lucid: the ramifications of the idea are, however, immense.  Darwinian evolution 
is the basic organizing theoretical idea behind all of biology.  Furthermore, the idea has 
proved immensely powerful heuristically, in developing more specific theories about the 
features of living things, physiological and behavioral.  This is what philosophy should strive 
to achieve: lucid solutions to conceptual problems that prove to be immensely fruitful outside 
philosophy itself, in science, or art, or politics, or living. 
     Darwin's achievement is usually, of course, understood to be scientific rather than 
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philosophical.  There are several puzzling features about Darwin's theory, however, if it is 
treated as a straightforward scientific theory, comparable to a theory of physics.  It is quite 
different from any dynamic physical theory, in that it does not predict how systems evolve.  
Despite being profoundly explanatory, the theory does not make straightforward empirical 
predictions in the way in which physical theories do.14  All physical theories have endlessly 
many rival (even if often less simple) theories; it is very hard even to think of a remotely 
plausible rival to Darwin's theory. 
     These puzzling features disappear the moment we regard Darwin's theory as, first and 
foremost, the solution to the philosophical problem of explaining the natural coexistence of 
the purposive and physical by explaining how and why this coexistence has evolved.  In order 
to solve this problem, quite different from the standard problem of theoretical physics, the 
theory must satisfy stringent requirements very different from those required of a physical 
theory. 
     Above I pointed out how paradoxical it is to ask for an explanation of phenomena that can 
be explained simultaneously in two different ways; in so far as this involves employing a 
third kind of explanation, it might seem only to compound the difficulty.  We are now in a 
position to see how Darwin's explanation cunningly avoids this problem.  It does so by being 
a special case of the following type of general historical explanation, required whenever 
states of affairs or processes exist which are simultaneously explainable in terms of two 
different kinds of explanation, E1 and E2, compatible with one another, but neither reducible 
to the other.  Assume that E1 is the more inclusive kind of explanation, in that it applies to 
everything to which E2 applies, and much more besides.  And assume, further, that initially E2 
did not apply to anything, only E1 being applicable to phenomena.  The task of the general 
historical explanation is to explain how and why phenomena arose capable of being explained 
and understood simultaneously by means of both kinds of explanation, E1 and E2.  (In what 
follows, I indicate like this, in brackets, how Darwinian theory satisfies the relevant 
requirement.)  
     The general historical explanation must be such that: 
(a) It specifies how the phenomenon to be explained, the co-applicability of E1 and E2, has 
arisen, perhaps over a very long stretch of time.  (All of life has evolved gradually from a 
single, primitive source during a period of some four billion years.) 
(b) It may need to break the entire evolution down into many small evolutionary steps.  (Big 
changes, such as the creation of new species, the development of multi-cell organisms, land 
animals or animals that can see or fly, must be shown to be the outcome of a great number of 
small steps, each step being selected for because it has survival-value.) 
(c) These must be such that each is explainable, plausible, understandable, in both senses of 
explanation, E1 and E2, simultaneously. (Each step must be the outcome of a probable 
mutation (physically explicable) which must have survival-value (physically and purposively 
explicable).) 
(d) A pattern of explanation must be specified for the (gradual) evolution of phenomena 
explicable by means of both E1 and E2, this pattern of explanation being such that it does not, 
initially at least, in any way presuppose E2 type explanations.  If this pattern of explanation 
does subsequently exploit a E2 type explanation, this must be couched in terms of E2 type 
phenomena whose evolution has already been explained.  (The Darwinian pattern of 
explanation is based on replication, inherited variations, and natural selection.) 
(e) This pattern of explanation must predict at least general features of the way in which E1 
and E2 dovetail together.  (Living things must be reasonably well-adapted to their 
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environment, i.e. such as to be well-designed from the standpoint of attaining the goals of 
survival and reproduction.  Characteristic maladaptations can also be explicable in terms of 
the evolutionary past.)   
(f) An initial stage must be specified which is such that E2 scarcely applies  -  there being 
hardly any trace in the events of the pattern required for E2 to be applicable.  (In the case of 
evolution, this has not yet been done satisfactorily.) 
     This special type of historical explanation for the coexistence of E1-type and E2-type 
phenomena is successful in so far as it cunningly exploits features of both E1 and E2 type 
explanations to render intelligible the gradual development of E2-type phenomena 
superimposed on E1-type phenomena.  The nature of the solution to the problem is rigorously 
prescribed by the nature of the problem: this is why Darwin's theory of evolution seems 
uniquely fitted to explain evolution, and seems quite different from theories of physics. 
     I have assumed so far that it is proper to interpret Darwin's theory of evolution as 
providing an explanation for the gradual evolution of purposiveness in a purposeless 
universe.  There is of course another view: Darwin's theory explains purposiveness away.  It 
reveals that living things are not really purposive, and only appear to be so.15   
     One fundamental disadvantage of interpreting Darwinism 
in this second way is that a hiatus is artificially created when it comes to the task of 
explaining the evolution of genuinely purposive human life  -  unless one takes the heroic 
path of those who, like B.F. Skinner, deny that even human beings are genuinely purposive: 
see Skinner (1973).  Adopting the view that Darwinian theory explains the gradual evolution 
of purposiveness in Nature (and does not merely explain apparent purposiveness away)  -  all 
living things being essentially purposive in character  -  creates no special, artificial hiatus 
when it comes to explaining and understanding the evolution of human purposiveness. 
     The basic reason, however, for rejecting the view that Darwinian theory eliminates 
purposiveness from Nature is that this view makes a nonsense of the theory itself.  The key 
notion of natural selection presupposes purposiveness: natural selection involves the selection 
of those variations that are best able to realize the goals of survival and reproductive success 
in the given environment.  It is only if there are entities that can be construed to be pursuing 
these goals, in however a primitive and elementary a way, that Darwinian theory has any 
application at all. 
     It is vital to appreciate that two notions of "purposiveness" can be distinguished, the 
compatibilist notion expounded above, and an incompatibilist, quasi-Aristotelian notion, 
which is such that, if something can be explained and understood purposively then it (or 
events associated with its actions) cannot, even in principle, be fully understood causally or 
physically.  The incompatibilist notion, if applied to living things, implies vitalism, and a 
rejection of physicalism.  If the only notion of purposiveness that we are prepared to 
acknowledge is the quasi-Aristotelian one, then we will be forced to interpret Darwinian 
theory as eliminating purposiveness from Nature (granted that we do not want to accept 
vitalism).  Aristotle is a towering intellectual figure, but he should not be permitted to 
dominate the way we think in the 21st century.  Adopting the non-Aristotelian, compatibilist 
notion of purposiveness makes it entirely proper, scientifically, to declare that life is 
essentially purposive in character, the extraordinary coexistence of the purposive and physical 
in living things being explained by Darwinian theory (the theory rendering the progressive 
evolution of purposiveness in Nature intelligible). 
     Those who oppose purposiveness in biology, do so under the impression that they are 
opposing Aristotelianism.  What the above shows is that they are themselves the victims of 
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Aristotelian modes of thought.  In so far as opposition to purposiveness in biology exists (due 
to the failure to take compatibilist purposiveness seriously), this is yet another example of the 
harmful influence of Aristotle on science! 
     Interpreting Darwinism as explaining the evolution of purposiveness in Nature has one 
major consequence.  It means that we are justified in explaining and understanding our 
existence as being the (unintended) outcome of the purposive activity of animals over 
countless generations.  There is (in principle) a purely physical historical explanation of our 
existence, it is true; but this can only explain our existence as purely physical beings.  If we 
want to understand, in historical (or evolutionary) terms, our existence as purposive beings 
(necessary if we are to understand ourselves as persons), then it is both legitimate and 
necessary to refer to the purposive activity of our ancestors.  We must refer to the skilful way 
that they have sought food, avoided predators, acquired mates, cared for offspring.  We must 
refer to their "skills", their "perceptiveness", "intelligence", "perseverance", "courage", 
"devotion", etc., all these being interpreted in purely purposive ways, so that even a robot 
could exhibit these qualities.  (Below all this will be reinterpreted personalistically.)  Without 
the prior existence of all this sophisticated purposiveness, we would not exist (which is not to 
say, of course, that our existence was intended). 
6 What Role does Purposiveness Play in Darwinian Evolution? 
     Darwinian evolution is not itself purposive in character; it is nevertheless the case (as I 
have just claimed) that the purposiveness of individual living things plays a role in evolution. 
 Or, in other words, the purposeless mechanisms of evolution are affected by purposive 
features of the (living) things that the mechanisms operate on.  The purposes of living things 
influence but do not determine the path of evolution. 
     At once the question becomes: How, and to what extent, do the purposes of living things 
influence evolution?  Precisely what role does purpose play in evolution? 
     Immediately after life first began, purposiveness had, we may assume, a vanishingly small 
role to play in the Darwinian mechanisms of evolution.  These mechanisms of random 
inherited variations and natural selection really were blind and purposeless.  But then, as 
living things became, gradually, less primitive, more diversified, more diversely and richly 
purposeful, so that the actions of living things began to affect the survival chances of other 
living things in various ways, purposiveness began to play an increasingly important role in 
the Darwinian mechanisms of evolution, without this role being such that the mechanisms 
became themselves purposeful in character.  
     What is the minimal role for purpose in evolution?  It is to contribute to the evolutionary 
process only via natural selection, the only purposefulness involved being that of the living 
things that are the subject of selection.  What is selected for, we need to remember, is the 
capacity to pursue the goals of survival and reproduction in the given environment.  The goal-
pursing activity of living things (primarily growth in the case of plants) thus has a minimal 
influence on evolution from the outset, in that natural selection presupposes, and acts upon, 
activity (or growth) directed towards the goals of survival and reproductive success. 
     It is worth noting that, even when purpose plays this minimal role in evolution, it can still 
be a very substantial role.  A change in purposive activity, brought about for whatever reason, 
which persists across generations, can have dramatic consequences for subsequent evolution. 
 What has survival value (wings, feet, flippers, fur or whatever) may well depend crucially on 
the way of life, the kind of purposive activity that the animal in question engages in.  Thus a 
change in the way of life, whether brought about by a mutation, or an environmental change, 
or learning and imitation (to be discussed below), may change dramatically the survival value 
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of this or that bodily feature.  If a dog-like creature that runs about on land has an offspring 
which, as a result of a mutation, has flippers instead of legs, the outcome will be: death of the 
offspring.  If, however, the dog-like creature, earlier, had taken to catching fish in shallow 
water at the edge of a river or lake, the offspring with flippers might well survive and 
reproduce, the outcome being the beaver.16  Here, the flippers are caused by a mutation, but 
the survival of the creature with flippers is due to the prior change in the way of life.17  The 
transition from dog to beaver is due to two causes; (1) a prior change in way of life, the result 
of individual learning and imitation, and (2) a change in genes: from the standpoint of 
evolution, (1) is as important as (2).  In this way, changes in purposive activity may well form 
the leading edge of evolution.  The giraffe does not acquire a long neck directly as a result of 
straining to reach leaves that are high up; but if the proto-giraffe was not straining to reach 
such leaves, the mutation which produces a longer neck would not produce an animal good at 
surviving and reproducing.  The prior way of life is an essential part of the cause of giraffes 
having long necks.  There is, in this wholly Darwinian and non-Lamarckian way, a partial line 
of causation from change in purposive activity to subsequent persistence of genetic change.18 
 Changes in purposeful activity, which can be explained and understood in terms of purposive 
explanation, make a contribution to subsequent evolution, along with purely blind, 
purposeless mutations.   
     What is the maximal role for purpose in evolution?  One extreme kind of possibility would 
be that the path of evolution accords with the purpose of animals, having been brought about 
(in part) by the active pursuit of that purpose.  In other words, the end product of a stretch of 
evolution has come about because it was the purpose of animals that this should happen. Our 
purposes have this effect on evolution when we breed animals and plants so as to meet certain 
predetermined requirements, or breeding goals.  The initially blind mechanisms of Darwinian 
evolution lend themselves to being (partially) commandeered and controlled by animal 
purpose in this way.  This is all the more the case if new forms of life are created artificially 
by genetic engineering (something that has already been achieved, to a limited extent).  In this 
case, genetic changes, instead of being blind mutations, are under purposive control, and 
selection, which in all other circumstances plays a vital role in evolution, can be dispensed 
with. 
     A less extreme version of breeding than the above is a common occurrence in the Natural 
world.  Animals act as breeders, without realizing that this is what they are doing, even in a 
purely purposive sense of "realizing" or "not realizing" what one is doing.  Sexual selection is 
a sort of "self" breeding.  So is "offspring selection", as it ought perhaps to be called  -  the 
activity of selecting certain offspring to survive and others to die, either by killing certain 
offspring, or by preferential feeding and caring.  "Predator" selection involves breeding living 
things that are increasingly difficult to eat; and "predator-avoidance" selection involves 
breeding predators that are ever better as predators.  Hunting and being hunted involves 
mutual breeding, each breeding the other to become better and better at playing the game of 
hunting-and-being-hunted.  Hunting leads to a kind of evolutionary arms race  -  a process of 
mutually harmful breeding of the enemy so that it becomes more and more deadly or evasive. 
 (The breeder unknowingly breeds for the opposite of what is in his own best interests.) 
     The purposes of animals influence the path of evolution in other ways as well, unintended 
breeding being widely distributed throughout all of evolution.  One might almost say: 
according to Darwinian theory, life breeds itself into existence without quite realizing what it 
is doing.  This is the purposive core of the theory.  Indeed, we have here, perhaps, a new 
formulation of Darwinian theory, namely: 
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The Purposive Formulation of Darwinism: Life unknowingly breeds itself into existence.19 
     Breeding involves changing the environment of the living thing in some way, either 
directly by one's own actions, or indirectly.  And vice versa, changing the environment of a 
living thing may well lead to breeding (whether intended or not).  Thus changing the 
atmosphere, as when oxygen was formed, led to (unintended) breeding.  Much more 
generally, whenever a living thing colonizes a new region it changes the environment of other 
living things in that region: this is likely to lead to breeding.  The environment is significantly 
changed for some species if the new living things are predators, or are a source of food, or 
competitors for food, or the dead bodies and waste products are sources of food.  Even if none 
of this obtains for some species in the region, nevertheless the colonizing life may still have 
an indirect affect, in that other living things in the region, that are predators or a source of 
nourishment, may be affected.  Darwin himself did much to demonstrate the 
interconnectedness and interdependence of many different sorts living things; what this 
demonstrates is how widespread and important the kind of unknowing breeding that we have 
been considering will be in evolution.  Finally, living things may influence the environment 
of their offspring by "choosing" (in a merely purposive sense) such and such an environment 
for offspring to grow up in: this too involves unknowing breeding. 
     Above we saw how changes in purposive action that persist across generations can have 
dramatic subsequent evolutionary consequences.  This constitutes unknowing offspring 
breeding if the change in purposive activity is itself purposively explicable, as involving 
purposive "choice" ("choice" of new  environment or food).  The change in purposive activity 
may come about because of a mutation in genes controlling behaviour; if this leads to 
subsequent evolution in offspring, this only constitutes unknowing breeding of offspring in a 
very weak sense.  (Persisting changes in behaviour do not only come about because of 
changes in genes controlling behaviour: such persisting changes may come about because of a 
change of environment, a change in the environment, or because of imitation.)  
     It is important, even at the purposive level, to distinguish: 
(a) Knowing breeding: the breeder has the goal of breeding, and acts accordingly (even if not 
sentient or conscious). 
(b) Unknowing breeding: the breeder, in pursuit of goals, acts in such a way as the actions can 
be construed to be those of a breeder knowingly breeding for characteristics X, even though 
this is not the aim of the breeder in question. 
     We human beings engage in knowing breeding; other creatures engage in unknowing 
breeding.  If, however, by an "immediate-offspring" breeder we mean a parent that actively 
selects for such and such characteristics (related, presumably, to survival) in its offspring, 
then many birds and mammals that care for young may be knowing immediate-offspring 
breeders (in the special purposive sense of "knowing" being used here).  Knowing immediate-
offspring breeding is half way between (a) and (b). 
     The general picture of evolution drawn from the perspective of breeding amounts, then, to 
this.  To begin with, breeding scarcely exists at all: purposiveness plays its minimal role in 
evolution.  Then, as life diversifies and affects the environment, more and more unknowing 
breeding goes on.  With parental care, "immediate-offspring" breeding becomes knowing.  It 
is in this way that life breeds itself into existence. 
     So far we have discussed one general way in which purposiveness may influence evolution 
that is in addition to the "minimal" influence: namely via purposive activity that can be 
construed to be a kind of breeding.  There is another general way in which this influence may 
occur: namely via purposive action that directly influences the process of reproduction, and 
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therefore what is reproduced, as we shall now see.  
     Interpreting Darwinism as a theory about the evolution of purposiveness in the world 
means that the theory needs to be interpreted as being primarily about evolving ways of life, 
patterns of goal-pursuing activity.  In attending to evolving genes, evolving DNA, and 
evolving bodily structure or physiology, we are attending to that which makes possible and 
facilitates the way of life: but it is the way of life that is evolutionarily and biologically 
fundamental.  Biology, quite properly, is primarily about life, about living, and only 
secondarily about anatomy, physiology, and biological molecules.20 
     In the structure of the theory, reproduction plays a fundamental role  -  in particular 
reproduction of way of life, of pattern of purposive activity.  So far we have assumed that this 
is under genetic control (and influenced by the environment).  But once learning and 
imitation come into existence, a new mechanism of reproduction comes into operation, added 
on to the mechanisms of genetic replication.  This is reproduction by imitation.  Thus the 
adult chimpanzee way of living is reproduced (1) genetically, and (2) by imitation, as a result 
of the young imitating actions of adults.  An example of chimpanzee behaviour that is 
replicated by imitation rather than genetically is the action of poking a stick into termite nests 
to extract termites to eat; this behaviour is not, it seems, genetically controlled as some 
groups of chimpanzees have learned the trick, while others have not.  Another well-known 
example is that of tits learning by imitation to peck milk bottle tops to drink the cream. 
     Three kinds of evolution can be distinguished, which I shall call genetic, environmental 
and cultural.  An evolutionary change is (1) genetic (2) environmental or (3) cultural 
depending on whether it is the result of (1) genetic change (2) environmental change or (3) 
learning and imitation.  Here, (1) and (2) are involved from the outset of evolution, but (3) is 
a relatively recent form of evolution.  In fact (3) is a special form of (2). 
     There is a crucial terminological point that I must now stress.  The term "cultural 
evolution" is usually taken to mean (a) "the evolution of culture": see, for example Dawkins' 
discussion of "memes" (Dawkins, 1978, ch. 11); or Boyd and Richerson's book Culture and 
the Evolutionary Process (1985).  Here, however, by "cultural evolution" I mean (b) 
evolution of living things when the method of reproduction involves not just genes, but 
learning and imitation.  "Cultural evolution", here, means "evolution (in part) by cultural 
means".  According to (b), then, what evolves is exactly the same as before, individual living 
things pursuing characteristic ways of life; it is the method of reproduction that is new, in that 
it includes a cultural component, a component of learning and imitation.  (In what follows, 
risking tedious repetitiveness, I shall persistently emphasize that "cultural evolution" here 
means "evolution by cultural means".) 
     All that I require for what follows is that (b) is an entirely legitimate way of construing 
"cultural evolution" within Darwinian theory: I do not need to establish that it is the only 
legitimate way, and that all talk of "evolving memes" is illegitimate.    
     Nevertheless, it does seem to me that (b)  -  evolution by cultural means  -  should be taken 
as the primary, proper way to interpret and apply Darwinian theory in connection with 
purposive life that begins to evolve by means of cultural development.  This accords with the 
overall view, argued for above, that Darwinism should be interpreted as being about the 
evolution of purposiveness in nature.  It enables us to see what is special about human 
evolution  -  the dramatic flourishing of "cultural evolution"  -  as something that has deep 
roots in conventional Darwinian evolutionary processes, as we shall see below. 
     There are, furthermore, serious difficulties connected with construing "cultural evolution" 
in the way proposed by Dawkins (1978, ch. 11), and subsequently defended by Dennett 
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(1996, ch. 12), as the evolution of a new kind of entity, the meme, by means of Darwinian 
mechanisms.  As David Holdcroft and Harry Lewis (2000) have pointed out, there are too 
many disanalogies between evolving life and evolving memes.  It is not clear how the 
individual meme is to be identified; nothing seems to correspond to the distinction between 
gene and phenotype (roughly, the body of a living thing); meme evolution continually 
involves lines of descent separating and subsequently merging, in a way that does not happen 
in ordinary biological evolution; it is not even clear what a meme is (i.e. whether it is an 
artefact, a pattern of activity, an idea, or a pattern of neurological processes in the brain21).  
As it happens, both Dawkins and Dennett acknowledge such disanalogies between the 
evolution of memes and the evolution of life.  At most, Holdcroft and Lewis conclude, the 
whole idea of memes evolving in a Darwinian way amounts to no more than a metaphor: 
taken literally, as a theory of the Darwinian evolution of memes, it is false.22 
     There is an even more important point.  Tackling "cultural evolution" in the way I 
advocate, as "evolution by cultural means", provides a framework (the standard Darwinian 
framework) within which the gradual evolution of aspects of culture, such as meaning and 
knowledge, can be understood: see, for example, the discussion of the gradual evolution of 
meaning below.  This is because this approach automatically relates cultural artefacts to 
purposeful (and even consciously intentional) action.23  The meme perspective renders this 
impossible, and thus obscures just that which needs clarification.  Meaning, knowledge and 
communication begin before cultural evolution gets under way, and thus before memes exist 
(see section 8, vii, below): the meme viewpoint thus cannot account satisfactorily for the 
evolution of meaning and knowledge. 
     One can understand why Dawkins should have opted for the meme perspective.  Having so 
brilliantly argued for a gene-centred perspective, genes selfishly manipulating phenotypes 
they inhabit to produce more copies of themselves, one can see how and why Dawkins should 
come to see cultural entities as acting in the same way, manipulating the brains they inhabit to 
produce more copies of themselves.  But better, by far, to interpret Darwinism as being about 
evolving goal-pursuing living things, mechanisms of reproduction evolving as evolution 
proceeds. 
     It is tempting to think that memes might be the genes of cultural evolution: what genes are 
to genetic evolution (a part of the mechanism of reproduction of purposive living things), so 
memes are to cultural evolution (a part of the mechanism of reproduction of purposive living 
things, evolving by cultural means).  But this is not quite right either.  It would be more 
correct (but still not quite right) to say that it is the instinct and capacity to imitate plus the 
meme that is the gene of cultural evolution.  In the end the most that can be said is that, with 
the emergence of culture, of something like memes in evolution, it is the method of 
reproduction that is new, not what evolves (as Dawkins and Dennett hold). 
     As I have remarked above, cultural evolution (evolution by cultural means) is quasi-
Lamarckian in character, in that it involves something like the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics, namely: "inheritance by imitation" of purposive activity learned by parents (or 
ancestors).24  Purposive activity is handed on across generations directly, only the capacity to 
learn and imitate being reproduced genetically: it is this which makes it possible for cultural 
evolution to be cumulative, rapid, and even under purposive control.  Evolution by cultural 
means is profoundly important for our understanding of our own existence, for we are, to a 
unique extent, the product of a long, massive process of cultural evolution (interacting with 
genetic and environmental evolution).  Thus, in order to understand the evolution of human 
consciousness and free will, it is important to understand the Darwinian account of the 
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evolution of cultural evolution.  What are the Darwinian reasons for cultural evolution 
(evolution by cultural means) to come into existence?  
     There are two components to cultural evolution: the capacity of individuals to learn to do 
new things; and the capacity to imitate (that is, to learn from the learning of others). 
     The first capacity has obvious survival value; its widespread existence in the living world 
can thus be understood along Darwinian lines.  (It deserves to be noted in passing that the 
coming into existence of the capacity to learn in itself has consequences for subsequent 
evolution: being able to learn means being able to live in more diverse ways, in more diverse 
environmental niches, which in turn creates more diverse kinds of survival pressures, this in 
turn making subsequent evolution into diversity more likely.) 
     The second capacity (being able to imitate) is of survival value especially when there is 
parental care, since imitating parents probably has survival value (since if one's parents were 
not good at surviving and reproducing one would not exist oneself).  Parental care, in turn, is 
one of two basic strategies for reproducing: production of vast quantities of potential 
offspring, or parental care of a few potential offspring.  The second has a long evolutionary 
history: crocodiles and birds exercise parental care, and it is reasonable to suppose that 
dinosaurs exercised parental care.  (It would be interesting to know to what extent parental 
care is itself, in birds, and in chimpanzees, the outcome of imitation.) 
     The special feature of cultural evolution (evolution by cultural means) is that it can be 
cumulative across generations (each generation building or elaborating on what has gone 
before) without it being necessary to wait for the blind vagaries of mutations to produce what 
is required (if they ever do).  Above all, cultural evolution (evolution by cultural means) 
makes possible the progressive creation of language (without the absurdity of each linguistic 
development only being made possible by the appropriate, prior genetic change).  
     Once cultural evolution has come into existence it becomes possible for aspects of 
evolution to come under purposive control.  A project can be adopted, with a long-term aim, 
that is handed on from generation to generation by imitation.  The development of speech and 
writing enormously enhances this process.  The history of endeavours that persist across 
generations, whether successful like science, or somewhat less successful like the search for 
world civilization, becomes possible.  Genetic plus environmental plus cultural evolution 
eventually becomes history (so far, of course, only in a purposive sense). 
     Cultural evolution can have dramatic consequences for genetic and environmental 
evolution.  The beginnings of a language arising as a result of cultural evolution may well 
lead to a situation which is such that being good at using the language is essential for 
reproductive success: if you cannot speak well, you cannot get a mate.  A new environment is 
created such that, being-good-at-speaking is selected for.  Our capacity for language 
acquisition and use, genetically programmed, has almost certainly arisen in this sort of way, 
as a result of the prior existence of language created by cultural evolution.25  Cultural 
evolution leads to genetic evolution, to changes in physiology.26 
     This concludes my account of the way in which the Darwinian explanation of the 
evolution of purposiveness itself subtly, and entirely legitimately, uses the concept of purpose 
 -  evolution itself being under changing and increasing purposive influence, to the extent that 
the whole character of evolution is gradually changed.  It is vital to appreciate, however, that 
the concept of purpose that is being appealed to here is the compatibilist, anti-Aristotelian, 
non-reductionist concept, indicated above.  As life evolves, the role for purposive explanation 
becomes greater and richer; being compatibilist, however, it does not negate the possibility of 
everything being explained physically; but equally, being non-reductionist, purposive 
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explanations are an essential ingredient of an historical, evolutionary understanding of life 
today, necessary if we are to understand ourselves, and other living things, as purposive 
beings.  A purely physical account of evolution could only enable us to understand ourselves 
as physical systems, not as purposive beings. 
    
7 Is an Evolutionary Explanation of Sentience, Consciousness and Free Will Possible? 
     So far we have discussed how Darwinian theory is able to give an evolutionary 
explanation for the coexistence of the purposive and physical in the world.  Can we, 
analogously, show how Darwinian theory is able to give an evolutionary explanation for the 
coexistence of the personalistic and the physical in the world?  Can neo-Darwinism explain 
the evolution of sentience, consciousness and free will? 
     At once a difficulty arises.  Darwinian theory is concerned with reproductive success; but 
reproductive success depends on what you do, and not on what you think or feel.  It may be 
that sentience, consciousness, free will, play a vital role in producing action required for 
survival and reproductive success: but if so, all that is required is "sentience", 
"consciousness" and "free will" in a thoroughly purposive (or functional) sense of these terms. 
 As long as the relevant people or animals are behaving as if they are sentient, conscious or 
free, it cannot matter at all that they are not really sentient, conscious or free.  A Darwinian 
explanation of the personal (as opposed to the purposive) seems, in other words, impossible. 
     This may well appear to be the problem confronting the development of a Darwinian 
explanation of consciousness.  Given the viewpoint developed in this and the last two 
chapters, however, this problem disappears.  Darwinian explanation, like historical 
explanation generally (of the type specified above) has the task of explaining the coexistence 
of two kinds of comprehensibility, E1 and E2.  It uses, subtly, both kinds of explanation.  So 
far, E1 and E2 have been physical and purposive explanations respectively.  We have already 
agreed, however, that personalistic explanation cannot be reduced to purposive or physical 
explanation, or any combination of the two.  Therefore, as long as Darwinian explanation is 
concocted in terms of physical and purposive modes of explanation, this can never, of itself, 
give rise to personalistic explanation, or explain how and why the personalistic (sentience, 
consciousness, free will) comes into existence.  If our Darwinian explanation is to succeed in 
rendering intelligible the coexistence of the physical and the personalistic, then we must feed 
in the personalistic mode of explanation from the outset, as it were; we cannot extract it from 
a purely physical and purposive starting point. 
     Granted that we have sentient, conscious, free, or even wise life before us, and granted that 
this is adequately described, explained and understood purposively, what does the 
corresponding personalistic explanation add to this?  It tells us what the creatures or persons 
experience, feel, see, think, desire, fear, decide, imagine as we ourselves might experience, 
feel, etc., these things.  The purposive account is severely impersonal in character; it treats 
sentient, conscious beings as if they were robots, merely simulating the having of 
experiences, feelings, perceptions and so on.  Personalistic understanding of the mouse, the 
bat, the owl, the fox or chimpanzee enables us to understand what it feels like to be the 
mouse, the bat, the owl, etc.  The myriad smells of the night air waft before us; the rustle of 
leaves, the flickering of a shadow, the echo of our squeaking, the sharp pang of hunger, the 
confused pleasures and pains of animal life, come vividly into existence in our imagination.  
Personalistic explanations will be functionally similar to corresponding purposive 
explanations, but will be richer in content in that the experiential dimension will be added on. 
 There will be meaning and value, contentment and tragedy, pleasure and anguish, and 
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reasons for action that only those who have had the appropriate experiences, desires and fears 
can understand. 
     Adding on the experiential dimension might contribute to understanding why certain sorts 
of sensations or perceptions have more survival value than others.  Consider, for example, the 
evolution of the perception of colour.  At an early stage, we might imagine, perceived colours 
are such that they do not sharply differentiate differently coloured objects, making ripe fruit 
or predators that much more difficult to discern.   
Gradually, as the brain evolves, perceived colours become more and more vividly distinct.  
An experiential understanding of why one set of colour-experiences has greater survival value 
than another set becomes (in principle) possible, even though this will be mirrored by a 
purposive (or functional) understanding, which will not require that one has the relevant 
colour experiences oneself. 
     To sum up, personalistic/physical evolutionary explanations will match, but will not be 
reducible to, corresponding purposive/physical evolutionary explanations. 
8 The Evolution of Sentience, Consciousness and Free Will 
     We come, at last, to the task seeing how it might be possible for neo-Darwinism to explain 
the evolution of sentience, consciousness and free will.  Of these, the evolution of sentience 
presents, in my view, the greatest mystery.  Once inner experiences of some kind exist  -  
sensations of pain and pleasure, tactile, visual, olfactory or auditory sensations  -  it is just 
about conceivable that further elaboration of such inner experience becomes consciousness, 
self-consciousness, the full range of human awareness.  But the first step, the beginnings of 
an inner world known to itself, seems inherently inexplicable. 
     In part, of course, as we have seen above, the sense that there is a profound, unsolvable 
mystery here is based on a misunderstanding.  It is based on the idea that a physical-plus-
purposive evolutionary explanation ought to suffice to explain the emergence of sentience, 
and yet seems hopelessly ill-equipped to do so.  Once it is appreciated that physical-plus-
purposive descriptions and explanations cannot in principle capture or encompass the 
experiential, the sentient, for reasons given above, it becomes clear that in demanding this we 
are demanding the inherently impossible.  What we can legitimately set out to discover is how 
sentience, at its most primitive, correlates with purposiveness, with control or functional 
aspects of the brain.  What developments in brain structure and function are in fact associated 
with the first primitive beginnings of sentience?  (This question, though legitimate to ask, is 
nevertheless fiendishly difficult to answer, due to the inherent difficulty of determining 
whether such and such a living brain, of a sparrow, let us say, or a mouse, really does have 
sentience associated with it.  In order to compare and contrast mouse and human sentience we 
require a composite mouse-human brain, able to generate neurological processes associated 
with both mouse and human sensations.  But would even this bizarre possibility tell us what 
we want to know?  Mouse-type neurological processes might give rise to sentience in the 
mouse-human brain, and yet give rise to no sentience at all in the exclusively mouse brain.) 
     In what follows, I argue that human consciousness and free will have arisen as a 
consequence of a number of prior, cumulative evolutionary steps, involving the emergence of 
such things as motivational control, learning, imagination, imitation, personalistic 
understanding, intentional communication.  Each step may be interpreted in a purely 
purposive way; indeed, even consciousness and free will may be so interpreted: my argument 
is, however, that as these control, purposive steps are reached so genuine personalistic 
sentience, consciousness and free will come gradually into existence over evolutionary time.  
In what follows I do not simply postulate what I seek to explain; rather, I postulate the 
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emergence of a new control capacity which is, I argue, correlated with the emergence of the 
experiential and personalistic.  The succession of evolutionary steps27 towards human 
consciousness that I wish to stress is summed up in the diagram. 
     A precondition for the emergence of sentience is, I suggest, the evolution of brains that (a) 
control an increasing variety of actions and (b) do so increasingly by means of what may be 
called active control as opposed to sequential control.  Active control has a kind of flexibility,  
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Imagining  =  Making neurological processes occur in your brain that are analogous to the      
                      processes that would occur were you actually doing what you imagine you are   
                      doing. 
Personalistic Understanding  =  Imitating in imagination what the other person is doing and 
                                                 imagining. 
Imitation + Imagination   =  Personalistic Understanding 
a capacity for learning, which sequential control does not have; thus in linking the emergence 
of sentience to the emergence of more and more active control over a greater and greater 
variety of actions, I am linking it to the capacity to learn. 
     The functioning brain (whether of insect, mammal or robot) can be thought of as 
consisting of three interacting parts: a goal-representing part, G, which represents the goal 
that is actively being sought; a perceptual part, P, which represents the current state with 
respect to the goal, and a motor part, M, which controls movement so that the current state 
moves towards attainment of the goal.  As time passes, the animal or robot will pursue a 
succession of goals, g1 ... gn.  It may be that a properly completed succession of such goals 
adds up to the attainment of some overall goal, g(1...n).  Granted that the animal or robot 
pursues g(1...n) by pursuing g1 ... gn in proper sequence, there are two quite different kinds of 
control-structure which make this possible. 
i Sequential Control.  At any given instant, the actively controlling part of the brain, 
G+P+M, is pursuing one or other of g1, g2 ... gn.  Furthermore, the brain is so structured that 
completion of g1 triggers G to represent g2, completion of g2 triggers G to represent g3, and so 
on until gn (and hence g(1...n)) is attained. 
ii Active Control.  At any given instant, the actively controlling part of the brain, G+P+M is 
such that G represents the overall goal to be attained, g(1...n), G+P+M operating so that g1, g2 
... gn are in turn pursued and attained. 
     The actively controlling brain represents, in G, the basic goal g(1 ... n) being pursued, and 
adjusts M in the light of P so that g(1 ... n) may be attained.  The sequentially controlling 
brain represents, in G, in sequence (if all goes well) g1, g2 ... gn, at any stage P and M 
operating so that the goal of that stage may be attained.   
     Sentience arises, I suggest, as the variety of goals sought increases, and as sequential 
control becomes, more and more, active control. 
     Consider the following example of sequential control.  There is a kind of wasp that lays its 
eggs in a burrow.  The wasp first builds the burrow, then flies around looking for a cricket 
which is then stung, paralysed, and taken to the burrow.  The wasp deposits the cricket 
outside the burrow, inspects the burrow, emerges to drag the cricket into the burrow, lays the 
eggs, and closes the burrow.  When the eggs hatch, the paralysed but still living cricket is 
food for hatched grubs. 
     On the face of it, this looks as if the basic goal was under "active control" and, to that 
extent, the wasp "knew what it was doing".  This is, however, refuted by the following 
experimental result.  If, when the wasp is inspecting the burrow, the cricket is removed a little 
from the burrow, the wasp will emerge, move the cricket to the predetermined distance from 
the burrow, and reinspect the burrow; and this can be repeated up to forty times.28 
     The conclusion is clear.  The wasp is operating under sequential control.  Its brain actively 
pursues in turn something like the following goals: g1: build burrow; g2: find, sting and 
paralyse cricket; g3 return to burrow and place cricket 5 cm. from the burrow; g4: inspect 
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burrow; g5: drag cricket into burrow; g7 close burrow.  The completion of one goal triggers 
the representation and pursuit of the next.  The overall way the subordinate goals are pursued 
and put together cannot be adjusted by what is learned during the pursuit of any subordinate 
goal. 
     It is just this latter that is possible when the brain actively controls the pursuit of the basic 
goal.  In this case, something that is learned during the pursuit of a subordinate goal, gr, can 
affect the way all the other subordinate goals are pursued and put together in time.  Active, 
functioning feedback mechanisms relate to the overall goal and not just to the subordinate 
goal being pursued.  
     There is, I suggest, a further step involved in the emergence of sentience, namely, the 
emergence of: 
iii Motivational Control.  The more it is the case that quite complex sequences of actions 
leading up to the attainment of a goal  -  such as hunting  -  are under active control, the more 
problematic becomes the means whereby such control is to be achieved (as far as brain-design 
is concerned).  At a certain stage this problem is solved by active control becoming what may 
be called motivational control: the goal is represented in the goal-determining part of the 
brain, G, in such a way that the animal is prompted to try to attain the goal without any 
definite strategies for obtaining the goal being preprogrammed in the brain.  The animal has 
to learn, to discover for itself, as it were, how the goal is to be achieved.  The animal is 
prompted to pursue a goal specified in only rather general terms by neurological processes 
going on in the animal's brain; precisely what goal is to be pursued, and what methods are to 
be adopted, has to be "worked out" by the animal, and will depend on past experience, on 
what has been learned.  The goal, here, might be food; in this case, neurological processes go 
on in the brain which prompt the search for food without any specific sequence of actions 
being predetermined.  This, I suggest, is the basic requirement for the emergence of sentience; 
in the particular case considered, the neurological processes that prompt the search for food 
would be experienced by the animal as hunger. 
     On this view, then, neurological processes begin to be experienced as feelings and desires 
when they are such that they prompt the animal to act in ways that are determined in only 
rather open-ended, non-specific ways, this making flexibility and learning possible.  The 
animal feels hunger, thirst, fear, anger, exhaustion, curiosity, sexual attraction, protectiveness 
towards young, and acts accordingly.  Animals do what they feel like doing, what their desires 
and fears prompt them to do, and natural selection ensures that their brains are so designed 
that, in the given environment, feelings and desires, or, in other words, the corresponding 
control processes in the brain, prompt animals to do what they need to do to survive and 
reproduce.  Furthermore, perception becomes sentient as a result of being linked to 
motivational control, to feeling and desire.29 
     Spiders do not build webs as a result of a generalized, insistent impulse to build a web; 
they are under precise, sequential control to execute a series of quite specific actions, which 
leads to the construction of the web.  There is no sentience, no feeling or desire, no sensation, 
and no (or little) learning.  Lions, on the other hand, I surmise, do feel hunger; they do 
experience a generalized, insistent impulse to find food.  What needs to be done to obtain 
food, namely hunt, has to be learned.  Nature even arranges for hunting skills to be acquired 
during youth: cubs experience the irresistible impulse to engage in play, in mock combat.  
Unlike spiders, lions do have feelings and desires, and do experience sensations. 
     In short, as brains, during the course of evolution, become sufficiently sophisticated to 
guide the animal to pursue diverse goals of life necessary for survival and reproduction by 
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means of motivational control (construed in purely purposive terms), so authentic sentience 
comes into existence, the genuine experiencing of sensations, feelings and desires.  
Motivational control, and hence sentience, has survival value, and is thus selected for, 
because it facilitates learning, and learning has survival value. 
     We can see, further, how motivational control can lead to the beginnings of: 
iv Choice and Free Will.  Once a brain is sufficiently sophisticated to work by means of 
motivational control, it does not need to be very much more sophisticated to be able to 
represent more than one desire or feeling simultaneously, the stronger (or strongest) being the 
one that is acted upon.  Simultaneous experiencing of conflicting feelings or desires, such as 
hunger and fear, may however enable animals to learn, to improve their ability to act, in 
circumstances of conflict, as when there is both hunger and danger.  Animals constantly find 
themselves in such situations of conflict, in situations which require conflicting modes of 
behaviour, such as exploration for food, and flight from a predator.  It is conceivable that 
simultaneous representation of the corresponding conflicting feelings and desires, as a part of 
the operations of motivational control, facilitates learning how to act in such a way that the 
best justice is done to the two conflicting desiderata, in particular learning how to switch 
rapidly from one mode of action to another, when such a switch is required.  Thus the mouse 
learns to venture forth cautiously from its hole when there are indications of the presence of 
cat, and learns when, with too great proximity of cat, to flee back into the safety of its hole.  
From find food and avoid cat the mouse learns to pursue a new goal: find food in such a way 
as to avoid cat. 
     This learned weighing of contradictory desiderata, this creation of new goals that best 
reconcile given contradictory goals, vital for survival, made possible by motivational control, 
may be thought of as the evolutionary origins of human choice and free will. 
     The fundamental goal of the mouse (survival and reproductive success) controls the 
learning of how to reconcile in practice the contradictory desiderata of food and safety.  
Human free will differs from this in part because humans have incredibly diverse, complex 
and variable aims and circumstances in comparison to those of the mouse (although the 
mouse might view the matter differently!).  There is, furthermore, the difference that the 
fundamental life-goal (or life-value) of the person is open to a much wider and richer range of 
interpretations than the fundamental life-goal of the mouse, as specified by Darwinism.  And 
there is the difference that the fundamental life-goal of the person may evolve with time in a 
way which does not happen with the fundamental Darwinian life-goal of the mouse.  (And 
there are other differences, such as differences in consciousness.)  What mouse-choice and 
human-free-choice (or even human-wise-choice) have in common, however, is the presence 
of learning how to choose between conflicting desiderata, this learning going on in the 
interests of attaining the fundamental goal (or value) in life. 
     In section 12 of the last chapter, we saw that learning to acquire greater free will, learning 
to become wiser, ought to form an integral part of the concept of free will or wisdom, and 
helps solve the problem of the flexibility, the lack of rigidity, intuitively felt to be inherent in 
the notions of free will and wisdom.  The considerations just developed about mice and men 
suggest that "being able to learn how to make better choices between goals" ought perhaps to 
be regarded as basic to the difference between "free choosing" and mere "switching". 
     The next evolutionary step in the creation of consciousness is the development of: 
v Imagination.  Imagination arises whenever a control system is sufficiently sophisticated to 
produce control-processes analogous to control-processes (perceptual and motor) that would 
be going on were the entity (animal, person or robot) actually to be performing some action in 
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some environment, such as, for example, climbing a tree.  In this particular case, the entity 
"imagines" that it is climbing a tree. 
     This is a purely purposive, functional characterization of imagination. If, however, the 
control system, the brain, operates sufficiently by means of motivational control for the 
purposive entity to be sentient, then "imagination" as just characterized becomes authentic 
imagination, the genuine creation of inner experiences of possible states of affairs, more or 
less as we know it. 
     It is conceivable that, from an evolutionary and neurological standpoint, imagination 
grows out of motivational control.  The lion's feeling of hunger (persisting neurological 
processes) engenders the occurrence of neurological processes analogous (in control terms) to 
those that would occur were the animal to be hungrily devouring a freshly killed deer, and this 
in turn suggests and prompts the initiation of appropriate action, in this case hunting.  
Motivational control may require something like imagination if it is to become operable. 
     If this were the case, imagination would have obvious survival value.  But, quite apart 
from this possibility, being able to imagine has obvious survival value  -  for example, for 
animals that hunt.  Suppose that lions are hunting deer.  Three or four possible strategies are 
available: charge straight down the hill at the deer; crawl slowly towards the deer through the 
grass; send one or two lions to the other side of the deer, and chase the deer towards the 
ambush.  If lions are unable to imagine, and are obliged to try out these options in reality, 
attempting to put the first option into practice may scatter the deer and destroy the possibility 
of a successful hunt.  But if the lions are able to imagine, they can try out options in the 
imagination, failure in the imagination leaving the situation undisturbed.  Trying out possible 
solutions to problems in the imagination is always going to be less costly than trying out 
possible solutions in reality: in the extreme case, it spells the difference between life and 
death  -  dying in imagination being very much less lethal than dying in reality.   
     The achievements of imagination can be so impressive that some psychologists have been 
misled into thinking that an entirely new faculty of "insight" is required to explain them. 
Take the case of Kohler's experiments with apes.30  In one such experiment, the ape is 
presented with bananas hanging in the cage out of reach, and two boxes which, if piled one on 
top of the other, will enable the ape to reach the bananas.  An ape without "insight" might 
blunder around, stupidly trying out all sorts of solutions until the correct solution is hit upon 
almost by accident.  An ape ostensibly with "insight", sits and ponders until, suddenly, he gets 
up, piles up the boxes and gets the bananas.  The second ape appears to be vastly more 
intelligent than the first.  Actually, the only difference may be that the second ape blunders 
around, stupidly trying out all sorts of possibilities in the imagination.  The second ape is just 
as stupid as the first, but keeps its stupid efforts at solving the problem hidden from view by 
trying them out in the imagination only.  There is no need, as Kohler thought there was, to 
postulate some additional, mysterious faculty of "insight".  (Or, alternatively, insight amounts 
to nothing more than being able to solve problems, perhaps very stupidly, in the imagination.) 
     Dreaming is a kind of imagining.  Indeed, one might almost characterize imagining as 
dreaming when you are awake.  The fact that mammals dream is a strong indication that they 
can imagine. 
     There is here a possible Darwinian explanation for dreaming.  The survival value of 
dreaming is rather generally regarded as something of a mystery.  It may be, however, that we 
dream in order to develop the capacity to imagine.  Dreaming has survival value because 
imagining has survival value. 
     The consequences of being able to imagine are immense.  It vastly increases the scope of 
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the arena within which one acts, both in space and time.  If you cannot imagine, you cannot 
imagine that you are at other places and times, you cannot conceive of other places and times, 
and your world is, at any given time, restricted to your immediate environment.  Imagination 
creates the possibility of imagining the past, the future, other places.  Memory, in the sense of 
the recall of some past event, becomes possible. 
     Perhaps even more important, imagination makes possible an active inner mental life, vital 
to consciousness.  It is only because we can imagine that we are doing things, that we are not 
in fact doing, that inner mental action is possible at all.  All thought, all consideration of 
possibilities (essential for science) is only possible because of the possession of the capacity 
to imagine. 
     The next crucial step in the creation of human consciousness is, I suggest, the creation of: 
vi Personalistic Understanding.  This is to be understood in such a way that animals as well 
as humans can have personalistic understanding of each other.  It might be better to speak of 
"animalistic" understanding.  My claim is that consciousness as we humans know it comes 
gradually into existence with the progressive evolution of personalistic understanding, as 
characterized in chapter six.  Personalistic understanding, in turn, is the outcome of 
combining imitation and imagination. 
     We saw, above, that imitation has survival value where there is parental care (or a social 
life, more generally).  We saw, also, that imitation makes cultural evolution possible, thus 
already being of fundamental importance in our creation (in that we are above all the outcome 
of a long process of cultural evolution associated, especially, with the evolution of language). 
 It deserves to be noted that imitation, even in its most elementary and purposive form, has 
elements of personalistic understanding.  Even if I am a robot, in order to imitate another I 
must, in a control, purposive sense, regard the other as another me, use the actions of the other 
as a model for my actions.  In imitating another, we will even be reproducing in our brains 
control processes functionally analogous to control processes going on in the other's brain. 
     With sentience and imagination, something like full-blooded personalistic understanding 
becomes possible.  Creature A achieving personalistic understanding of creature B can be 
described as: A imitates B in his imagination, even to the extent of imitating what B is 
experiencing and imagining.  When imitation is carried to the lengths, in other words, of 
being an imitation, in imagination, of the other's inner actions as well as outer actions, then it 
constitutes personalistic understanding. 
     It deserves to be noted that if personalistic understanding is a kind of imagined imitation, 
it is also not so very different from imagination per se.  To imagine that I am doing something 
that I am not doing is not so very different from imagining that I am some other being, doing 
and experiencing what the other being is doing and experiencing. 
     Personalistic understanding, as characterized above as a kind of imagined imitation, makes 
it possible for the inner self to absorb features and characteristics of other inner selves; new 
features of inner selves that come into existence as a result can, in turn, evolve culturally 
(imitation being the key to cultural evolution).  There is here a mechanism for the progressive 
creation of features of the inner self that go to make up human consciousness by means of a 
process of cultural evolution. 
     More specifically, I suggest, personalistic understanding creates "self-consciousness", 
generally regarded as the distinguishing feature of human consciousness. 
     What happens, I suggest, is this.  In improving our personalistic understanding of others 
we encounter others' personalistic understanding of ourselves.  We encounter, in other words, 
the outer, public, other conception of ourselves.  This, we will discover, differs from our own 
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conception of ourselves.  As a result of becoming aware of ourselves as understood by others, 
we become aware of ourselves as we experience and understand ourselves.  And this latter is 
self-consciousness.  It is in other words the contrast between others' awareness of ourselves 
and our own awareness of ourselves that enables us to be aware of our own awareness of 
ourselves  -  thus becoming aware of our own self-awareness.  (Self-consciousness is perhaps 
awareness of self-awareness, rather than just self-awareness itself.)  Without being able to see 
ourselves from the perspective of others, we are not able to notice that there is also our own 
perspective of ourselves, fundamentally different from all the other perspectives in that it 
includes self-awareness. 
     Many young children go through a stage of being "self-conscious", as it is described.  This 
is acute awareness of others' perception of oneself, possibly accompanied by embarrassment, 
shyness or flirtatiousness.  Above I have in effect argued that self-consciousness, the genuine 
article, is a product of something that is often called "self-consciousness" but is actually acute 
awareness of others' awareness of oneself. 
     On this view, our own self-consciousness, that which we are most inclined to identify as 
our unique, innermost self, nearest to being our soul, our highly personal and individual 
identity, is actually something profoundly social and historical in character, made possible by 
personalistic understanding, and the cultural evolution of self-hood which is in turn made 
possible by personalistic understanding. 
     The close linking of human consciousness, including self-consciousness, to personalistic 
understanding, and therefore to the social, has the consequence that human consciousness 
acquires an historical dimension.  The kind of awareness we have of the awareness that 
others have of ourselves can develop, this leading to a development in our own self-
consciousness, in turn requiring a deepening of personalistic understanding.  The character of 
human consciousness grows through history.  We progressively bring each other into 
existence (the self being understood here to be the self-conscious self). 
     All this is facilitated by the development of: 
vii Communication and Language.  Indeed, the development of personalistic understanding 
(and so consciousness) and the development of communication and language provoke each 
other. 
     It is important to appreciate the multi-layered character of human communication, and 
therefore the step-by-step stages in which human communication can be built up from 
primitive animal communication.  Let us suppose A communicates to B.  The following 
stages can be distinguished. 
(i)  A acts in its own interests, for example goes rapidly into flight to avoid a predator; B 
takes this behaviour as an indication of something (in this case danger), for him, and acts 
accordingly. 
(ii) In addition, A does something which is such that the sole purpose of it is to communicate 
to B, even though A has no such conscious intention.  Here A might squawk as it goes into 
flight in a manner characteristic for that species in such circumstances; B reacts accordingly. 
(iii) In addition, A has the purpose of signalling to B since, if A knows that it is on its own it 
will not signal (e.g. squawk). 
(iv) In addition, A has the purpose of communicating the message of the action to B, so that, 
in the case of the squawk, the bird squawks in order to warn B.  If B is present but in no 
danger then the bird does not squawk. 
(v)  B understands the message, the meaning of the squawk. 
(vi) A has the purpose of B understanding the meaning of the message. 
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(vi) B understands this too. 
(vii) A intends B to understand this. 
     And so on (the multi-layers of mutual understanding, initially profoundly significant 
becoming, as one goes on further, increasingly insignificant). 
     As Grice has shown,31 human communication involves, quite essentially, multi-layers of 
mutually understood intentions.  If I am to communicate with you by means of language, I 
must intend this, you must understand that I intend it, and I must understand that you 
understand.  The progressive development of human communication through these stages 
from its beginnings in primitive animal communication is the progressive development of 
personalistic understanding and self-consciousness.  In this sense, the progressive 
development of communication, first without and then with language, is the progressive 
development of self-consciousness.  This progressive enrichment of communication is, at the 
same time, the progressive enrichment of meaning and knowledge.  There is meaning and 
knowledge even at stage (i), but it is meaning and knowledge of a very meagre kind (without 
cultural evolution, and therefore not involving anything like memes); once stage (vii) is 
reached, and assuming that "A intends B to understand that A has the purpose of B 
understanding the meaning of the message" is all to be understood personalistically, A and B 
both being sentience and consciousness, then something close to full human meaning and 
knowledge have been attained. 
9 Implications for Our Understanding of Our Human World Today 
     This concludes my quasi-Darwinian account of the evolution of sentience, consciousness, 
communication, language and free will in the physical universe.32  I finish with three further 
points  that affect our understanding of our human world today. 
viii The Discovery of Death.  Imagination makes it possible to become aware of death even 
when it is not threatened.  It makes it possible to discover the eventual inevitability of death.  
This discovery will be immensely aided by developments in personalistic understanding and 
language.  Given the fundamental role that survival plays in evolution, the discovery that the 
pursuit of survival is ultimately doomed to fail can only be traumatic.  Much of the effort of 
human culture is devoted to denying death, transforming it into a journey, into an unimportant 
event.  It will be both important and difficult for human consciousness to come to terms with 
the inevitability of death. 
ix Clash of Controls.  Mammals, we may presume, act as they do as a result of motivational 
control.  There are, in effect, two control systems: the master control system of hormones, 
levels of such things as sugar and oxygen in the blood, which controls emotions and 
motivations; and the servant control system, the functioning (sentient and partially conscious) 
brain of the animal.  Mammals plan their immediate actions, but do not plan their way of life; 
they do what they are prompted to do by their feelings and desires, and these come and go in 
such a way that the animal ends up living the way of life it needs to live in the given 
environment in order to survive.  As long as the conscious brain does not have a vivid and 
stable enough imagination to be persistently aware of months into the past and future, it will 
not be able to be conscious of the way of life; it therefore cannot be consciously planned and 
controlled. 
     But once the conscious brain, intended by evolution to be the servant control system, 
becomes aware of events stretching years into the past and future, it becomes possible for the 
conscious brain to attempt to plan the way of life.  Once the attempt is made, the servant 
control system seeks to become the master control system.  Conflict is inevitable.  This is the 
source of the conflict inherent in being human. 
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x From the Tribe to the Modern World.  Our psyches, our emotional, motivational and 
intellectual makeup, were designed to work well granted that we live in a hunting and 
gathering tribe, where everyone knows everyone else, and life proceeds from day to day.  It is 
reasonable to assume that ancestors which we have in common with other primates today 
lived, millions of years ago, in this fashion.  The hunting and gathering way of life is basic to 
our human nature. 
     In a multitude of ways, the modern world differs dramatically from hunting and gathering 
tribal life.  Many of the problems of the modern world are due to the fact that we are, 
emotionally and motivationally, ill-adapted to living in such a world.  The situation is made 
worse by our lack of understanding of the source of our difficulties.  The evolutionary 
framework provided here for the understanding our ourselves has, potentially, I believe, 
immensely important implications for our capacity to cope with our problems, and become, 
globally, a little wiser.33 
10 Science and Reason in the Physical Universe 
     The account, given above, of how non-sentient purposiveness evolves into sentience, 
personalistic understanding, consciousness, free will, communication and language assumes 
also, of course, that insentient belief, implicit in the actions of a merely purposive thing 
becomes, in turn, sentient belief, conscious belief, inter-personal belief, belief captured in 
language, belief sufficiently accurate and critically scrutinized to be deemed knowledge, even 
science.  The evolution of human knowledge and reason from their biological, purely 
purposive origins is intimately bound up with the evolution of consciousness, free will, 
personalistic understanding and communication. 
11 The Evolution of the Darwinian Mechanisms of Evolution 
     This chapter may be summarized as follows. 
     In order to understand the intricate and all but miraculous dovetailing together of (1) the 
physical and the purposive apparent in all life, and (2) the physical and the personalistic 
apparent in all sentient life, we need to appeal to Darwin's theory of evolution.  But, in order 
to be capable of explaining the evolution of purposiveness, sentience, consciousness, 
personalistic understanding and free will, Darwinian theory must be reinterpreted.  It needs to 
be interpreted as a theory that is intended, at a fundamental level, to explain the evolution of 
the purposive and the personalistic in the physical universe.  In order to do this, Darwinian 
theory exploits physical, purposive and personalistic modes of explanation.  However, if the 
Darwinian pattern of explanation for evolution uses purposive or personalistic explanations, 
at any evolutionary stage, these purposive or personalistic explanations must be couched in 
terms of purposive or personalistic phenomena whose evolution has already been given a 
Darwinian explanation.  (Darwinian theory must not presuppose what it seeks to explain.) 
     As evolution proceeds, and living things become more and more diversely and richly 
purposive and personalistic, the Darwinian mechanisms responsible for evolution themselves 
evolve.  They cease to be wholly blind and mechanistic, and gradually incorporate elements 
of the purposive and personalistic.  Above, in section 6, I indicated how this evolution of 
evolutionary processes comes about.  I conclude this chapter with a summary of some of the 
main steps involved in the gradual, evolutionary incorporation of the purposive and 
personalistic into the mechanisms of evolution.      
     The Darwinian mechanisms for evolution consist, essentially, of two parts: (a) 
mechanisms of reproduction, including reproduction of persisting, inheritable variations; and 
(b) mechanisms of selection.  Both evolve with evolution.  When evolution first got going, 
nothing as complex as the DNA molecule, plus attendant molecular machinery involved in 
  
 
 26 
reproduction, can have existed.  Initially mechanisms of reproduction involved very much 
simpler molecular processes. Genes, DNA, RNA, ribosomes and the genetic code (all a part 
of the mechanism of reproduction today) are the outcome of a long process of early evolution, 
perhaps for something like a billion years, that has left almost no trace.  Subsequently, such 
things as the evolution of multi-celled creatures (posing new problems of reproduction), sex, 
and the gestation of the fertilized egg in the womb, all amount to modifications of the 
mechanisms of reproduction.  Here, however, we are concerned with those steps in the 
evolution of the mechanisms of evolution that involve the gradual increase in the involvement 
of the purposive and personalistic in these mechanisms. 
     It is vital to appreciate that to say that the purposive is involved in the mechanisms 
responsible for evolution is not to say that these mechanisms are fully purposive in character.  
As we shall see, very many evolutionary steps need to take place, each slightly increasing the 
involvement of the purposive, before the blind, wholly purposeless mechanisms of evolution, 
that are in operation immediately after the origin of life, are transformed into fully purposive 
mechanisms of evolution. 
     Some important steps in the gradual incorporation of the purposive and personalistic into 
the Darwinian mechanisms responsible for evolution are the following. 
1.  Blind reproduction (with inheritable variations) and natural selection: initially wholly 
purposeless, the molecular processes involved in reproduction initially very different from, 
and much simpler than, those in operation today. 
2.  Blind reproduction (with inheritable variations) and natural selection, the latter having an 
element of purposiveness associated with it, due to the fact that what has survival value may 
depend on what purposes are being pursued, so that a persisting change in purposeful activity 
may contribute to subsequent inherited bodily changes (as in the cartoon example, discussed 
above in section 6, of the dog-like creature becoming a beaver).  Changes in purposeful 
activity that persist across generations may come about because of (a) genetic changes, (b) 
changes in the environment, (c) changes made to the environment by the living things in 
question (d) movement to a new environment (e) changes in purposeful activity due to 
individual learning, and imitation.  Subsequent inherited variations (the result of blind, 
random, purposeless occurrences) may only proliferate because of a prior change in 
purposeful activity, which has itself come about in one or other of ways (a) to (e).  In this 
case, the bodily change is due, in part, to the prior change in purposeful activity.  
Purposefulness contributes to the evolutionary change, even though the mechanism for the 
evolutionary change overall is, of course, not purposeful.34  In the case of (a), the contribution 
of purposefulness is at a minimum, because the change in purposeful activity occurs in a 
purely blind, random way.  As one goes from case (b) to (c), (d) and (e), the contribution of 
purposefulness is gradually increased.  The role of purposeful explanation in the Darwinian 
explanation for the evolutionary change is slightly increased. 
3.  As above, but the processes of selection involve, not just purposeless physical phenomena 
plus the purposeful actions of the evolving living thing in question (as in 1 and 2) but, in 
addition, the actions of other living things, such as predators, prey, potential mates, parents.  
The result, as we saw in section 6 above, is unknowing breeding.  Sometimes the outcome of 
breeding is in the interests of the breeder, as in the case of parents selecting offspring, and 
sexual selection.  More often, perhaps, the outcome is against the interests of the breeder, as 
in the case of the predator/prey relationship. 
4.  As above, but reproduction involves parental care.  Initially, parental care may merely 
increase the chances of survival of offspring, as in the case of crocodiles perhaps.  But it then 
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becomes essential, as in the case of birds and mammals.  Parental care may be under genetic 
control, but still involves purposive action.  The element of purposiveness increases, 
however, when parents learn how to exercise good parental care, and when parental care 
depends on the parent having been a recipient of parental care when young.  (In the latter 
case, an offspring reared without parents becomes incapable of parental care itself.) 
5.  As above, but reproduction (of way of life) also involves, in childhood especially, 
imitation of purposeful activity of parents or other adults, this activity the outcome of 
individual learning of some ancestor, or series of ancestors.  This step involves a dramatic 
injection of the purposiveness into the mechanisms of reproduction, and hence into the 
mechanisms of Darwinian evolution.  This new aspect of reproduction, based on learning and 
imitation, may be called cultural.  Its incorporation into the mechanisms of evolution has a 
dramatic effect on evolution (as I indicated in section 6 above) because it introduces a quasi-
Lamarckian character to evolution.  An animal can learn a new trick (catching termites by 
putting sticks into termite nests) which is then passed on to offspring by means imitation: an 
acquired characteristic is inherited (culturally). 
     As I remarked above, the instinct to imitate is likely to have survival value where there is 
parental care (and in any case requires at least that much social life).  Once there is parental 
care, in other words, the evolution of the instinct to imitate, and hence the possibility of 
cultural reproduction and evolution, can be explained along straightforward Darwinian lines.  
Thus, the evolution of parental care leads to the evolution of cultural reproduction and 
evolution, and the quasi-Lamarckian kind of evolution that results. 
     It may be objected that it is very artificial  -  little better than a play on words  -  to put 
"cultural reproduction" on a par with ordinary "biological" reproduction", the result of sex, 
fertilization of eggs, gestation, birth and growth to maturity, all under genetic control.  This 
objection is likely to be made by those who see evolution as primarily evolution of bodily 
structure, or of genes, DNA molecules and other molecular structures, physiology, design.  
Construing what evolves in such "biological hardware" terms leads one, when it comes to 
reproduction, to concentrate on processes that reproduce such "biological hardware", namely 
the conventional processes of biological reproduction. 
     If one adopts this "hardware" attitude towards what evolves then, when one is confronted 
by cultural evolution (evolution by cultural means), the response is likely to be that entities of 
a novel kind have begun to evolve, cultural entities which Dawkins has dubbed "memes".35 
     It is, however, not just legitimate, but of fundamental importance (as I have argued above), 
to interpret neo-Darwinism as a theory which explains how and why purposiveness has 
evolved in nature.  Darwinian theory gets off the ground, and only gets off the ground, when 
entities come into existence which can be construed to be, more or less successfully, pursuing 
the goals of survival and reproductive success.  Darwinian theory, and biology more 
generally, is about life.  In considering reproduction, within the context of Darwinian theory, 
what matters is the reproduction of ways of living, modes of goal-pursuing in the world.  
Granted this perspective, whatever is essential to the reproduction of a way of life must be 
judged to be an essential component of the Darwinian notion of "reproduction", and thus an 
essential part of the Darwinian mechanism of evolution (at a given stage in its evolution).  
Becoming an adult chimpanzee is not only a question of conception, embryonic development, 
birth and bodily growth; it also involves quite essentially learning how to act as an adult 
chimpanzee.  Without cultural inheritance (childhood learning through imitating adult 
chimpanzees) this would not be possible.  Being able to survive and reproduce may well 
depend on cultural inheritance: bereft of the opportunity of learning from adult chimpanzees 
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through imitation, a chimpanzee may well be incapable of surviving and reproducing in the 
natural environment.    
     Evolutionary changes that come about solely as a result of cultural evolution may play an 
essential role in subsequent evolutionary changes due to mutations.  (Variations only have 
survival value because of earlier changes in the way of life due to cultural evolution.)  I gave, 
above, a fictional example of this effect: the dog-like creature becoming a beaver.  It is 
reasonable to suppose, as I suggested above, that this interplay between cultural evolution, to 
be understood in purposive terms, and subsequent gene-based evolution, played a very 
important role in the evolution of the human capacity to learn, and develop, language.  What 
distinguishes us from all other living things is that we are the product of a massive process of 
cultural evolution, linked in the way I have just indicated to gene-based evolution.  Human 
consciousness, in so far as it differs from chimpanzee consciousness, is made possible by the 
evolution of language.  We only exist as human beings, in other words, because of the 
evolution of cultural evolution.   
6.  Steps 2 to 5 involve increasing incorporation of purposiveness into the Darwinian 
mechanisms responsible for evolution.  At some stage, however, feeling and desire enter the 
arena: the merely purposive becomes personalistic.  Steps 2 to 5 become further steps in the 
evolution of the mechanisms of evolution as the merely purposive is replaced by the 
personalistic.  And as such things as imagination, language, personalistic understanding and 
consciousness emerge, the kind of actions, open to being understood personalistically, that 
can be incorporated into Darwinian mechanisms of evolution, become more and more richly 
personalistic.  Thus breeding, which is, to begin with, unintended and purely purposive, 
becomes, with conscious human beings with some knowledge of breeding methods and 
results, a wholly conscious, intended process.   
7.  Once language and human culture are in place, massively facilitating the quasi-
Lamarckian processes of cultural evolution, it becomes possible for people to engage in 
projects that make progress across many generations.  Natural science is one strikingly 
successful example. 
8.  Genetic engineering, made possible by scientific progress, in turn a result of cultural 
evolution, renders the process of gene modification the outcome of conscious (personalistic) 
action. 
9.  Not all personalistic modifications of Darwinian mechanisms of evolution that are 
conceivable, have actually occurred.  One can imagine, for example, that humanity as a whole 
may one day discover how to take control of its own cultural evolution, its future, in such a 
way that progress is made towards global wisdom, civilization and enlightenment.  How this 
might come about will be discussed in the next but one chapter. 
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Notes  
1. For free action, the following must be the case.  Whenever we decide to perform some action 
A and as a result perform it, the brain processes that are the decision to do A must control 
muscles of the body so that action A results.  Whenever we ponder whether to do A or not, 
explore reasons for and against doing A, and come to a rational decision, the sequence of brain 
processes that are these processes of rational pondering and decision-making must occur in just 
the right way to constitute genuinely rational pondering and decision-making.  And vastly more 
demanding, for free action, the personalistic and physical must be matched so intricately, 
extensively and delicately that all (or almost all) counterfactuals corresponding to the 
personalistic explanation of the free action are included in the counterfactuals of the physical 
explanation of the action.  It is not just what actually happens that must match up precisely, as 
far as the two kinds of explanation are concerned; what would have happened if such and such 
had been the case, for infinitely many counterfactual, possible states of affairs, must match up 
precisely as well. 
2. The two-aspect, or multi-aspect solution to the human world/physical universe problem that I 
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am expounding in this book is, I claim, an immense improvement over Popper's "three worlds" 
view, which can be regarded as an attempt at solving the same problem, and is expounded in 
such works as: Popper (1972), (1977).  Popper's three worlds view is committed to the highly 
implausible idea that there exists a quasi-Platonic world of ideas, arguments, problems, etc., 
which exists largely independently of the material world of mind.  As we saw in chapter five, 
horrendous problems are created by this view as to how Darwinian evolution can possibly have 
created this new, almost autonomous world of ideas which, once created, actually interacts, 
with the physical world via physical processes occurring in conscious brains.  None of these 
difficulties faces the duo comprehensibility, compatibilist, experiential physicalist view that I 
am expounding and defending here. 
3. In chapter five I explored, and rejected, the possibility of extending physical and personalistic 
explanations so as to explain correlations between physical and mental aspects of brain 
processes. 
4. For Dennett (1996), Darwin's dangerous idea is a kind of "universal acid" which threatens to 
transform, even destroy, everything that we hold dear.  The perspective of this book is rather 
different.  It is physicalism, the idea of Smart, Laplace, de la Mettrie or, to trace it back to its 
origins, Democritus, that is dangerous, threatening to reduce our human world to mere physics, 
thus annihilating all meaning and value.  Darwin's wonderful idea explains how purpose, 
meaning and value have gradually emerged or evolved in a physicalist universe initially devoid 
of purpose, meaning and value.  (Dennett's brilliant book does, perhaps, on its last page, come to 
a similar conclusion.) 
5. The second and third of the three arguments for holding that personalistic explanations cannot 
be reduced to physical explanations, indicated in section 6 of the last chapter, establish also, 
when appropriately modified, that purposive explanations cannot be reduced to physical 
explanations.  Chalmers has argued very persuasively that the biological supervenes logically on 
the physical: see Chalmers (1996), 35 and 73.  If this is correct, does not this mean that 
biological and purposive explanations are reducible to physical explanations?  No.  In asserting 
that the biological supervenes logically and globally on the physical one is asserting that it is 
inconceivable that all the physical facts of this world remain the same but some biological facts 
are different.  But explanations, whether physical or purposive, refer not just to the facts of this 
world, but to a range of counterfactual situations, to a range of possible worlds.  The two 
arguments indicated in the last chapter exploit this feature of explanation to establish that 
purposive (and, to that extent, biological) explanation is not reducible to physical explanation. 
     It would seem reasonable to conclude from this that logical supervenience is a necessary, but 
not a sufficient condition for reducibility of explanation.  This is what Chalmers concludes: see 
Chalmers (1996), 48.  But this may be doubted.  If one gives purposive and biological 
explanations the kind of conjectural essentialistic interpretation indicated in ch. 3 in connection 
with physical explanation, then purposive and biological facts carry implications about 
counterfactual situations.  In this case, whether or not the purposive and biological supervene 
logically on the physical might depend on what counterfactuals are taken to be implicit in 
purposive and biological facts.  The thesis that the purposive and biological supervene logically 
on the physical is perhaps not as obvious as Chalmers supposes.  (Throughout this note I assume 
that the purposive and biological are characterized in a way that is free of perceptual or sensory 
qualities, and sentience.) 
6. More will be said in support of this claim below. 
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7. We may define living beings to be naturally occurring purposive beings.  Or they may be 
defined to be purposive beings able to reproduce themselves, which would make all current 
artificial purposive devices, such as robots, non-living, but which would make it possible for 
artificial life, in the defined sense, to be created in the future.  A step in this direction has been 
taken by Lipson and Pollack (2000), who have created robots able, in some respects, "to sustain 
their own evolution". 
8. When the programme of artificial intelligence began, in the 1950's, the basic idea was 
understood to be that of the feedback mechanism, which explained how purposiveness could 
exist in a way that is compatible with physicalism.  The AI movement then got sidetracked into 
computationalism, probably because of commercial pressures to design computers that 
functioned in response to programmes.  The original insight was lost sight of, and the vital link 
with life and evolution fell into decay.  Even as intelligent an author as Steven Pinker defends 
the computational theory of mind: see Pinker (1998), ch. 2.  The very name of the discipline 
"artificial intelligence" is a misnomer  -  I hesitate to say an indication of lack of intelligence.  
The discipline ought to have been called, from the outset, artificial life, or artificial control.  See 
Maxwell (1985): and see Clark (1997). 
9. For accounts of Darwinian theory, see: Darwin (1976), Maynard Smith (1975), Mayr (1982), 
Calow (1983), Dawkins (1978). 
10. For a delightful, if unorthodox, speculative theory about the origin of life see Cairns-Smith 
(1986).  See also Eigen (1992) and Kuppers (1990). 
11. It is striking that nowhere in his brilliant The Blind Watchmaker (1986) does Richard 
Dawkins attribute purposiveness to living things.  Throughout the book, the problem that 
Darwin's theory is held to solve is the problem of design.  But this is an inadequate way of 
construing Darwin's theory.  The very concept of design presupposes purpose: it is only when 
we know what the purpose of something is, that we can assess whether or not it is well-
designed.  Furthermore, in a physicalist universe, things can only pursue goals (be purposive) if 
they are more or less intricately designed to do so (embodying feed-back mechanisms, sensing 
devices, and the capacity to act or grow, at least to the extent of throwing a switch as in the case 
of the thermostat).  Finally, as I have just argued in the main text, Darwinian theory only makes 
sense when applied to things that are at least construed to be goal-pursuing, in that it requires 
these things to be interpreted as having the fundamental goal of reproductive success. 
12. Darwin did not himself see his fundamental problem in quite this light.  For Darwin, the 
basic problem was the origin of species, as enshrined in the very title The Origin of Species 
(Darwin (1968), first published in 1859).  Darwin understood, however, that his theory 
explained the manner in which living things are so beautifully and diversely adapted to their 
diverse environments and ways of life.  Adaptation presupposes purpose. 
13. The greatest defect in Darwin's presentation of his theory lay in his ignorance of the laws of 
inheritance, discovered by Mendel and published in an obscure Austrian journal in 1865, but 
generally ignored until the 20th century.  Lacking knowledge of the Mendelian rules of 
inheritance, Darwin had no adequate reply to the criticism that new variations would tend to 
disappear across generations as they blended in with pre-existing variations.  In later editions of 
his Origin of Species, Darwin even introduced elements of Lamarckism into his account of his 
theory, in an attempt to meet this and other criticisms of the original version of his theory. 
14. Darwinian theory is no doubt falsifiable.  Observing inheritance of acquired characteristics 
would refute the theory, in that it would refute the claim that the Darwinian mechanisms 
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responsible for evolution are the only evolutionary mechanisms in operation.  Nevertheless, 
Darwinian theory is not predictive in the way that a dynamical theory of physics, such as 
Newtonian theory, is predictive, in that it predicts how a system, such as the solar system, 
evolves in time.  Darwinian theory does not predict the course that evolution will take.  
Furthermore, Darwinian theory is parasitic upon other descriptive and explanatory accounts of 
phenomena, physical and purposive, and does not issue in its own descriptions of phenomena, 
as fundamental physical theories do. 
15. It is legitimate, I think, to attribute this "purposeless" view to Monod (1974) and Dawkins 
(1986).  Dawkins, in his defence, might claim that he wishes only to argue that the mechanisms 
of evolution are "blind" and purposeless, not the products, namely living things.  This reply is 
fair enough.  Nevertheless, as I have already indicated, Dawkins fails to emphasize the vital 
point that genuinely purposive beings are generated as a result of the operations of the 
purposeless mechanisms of evolution.  Dawkins interprets Darwinian theory as solving the 
problem of design in the biological world, and the problem of why living things should be so 
well adapted to their environment.  Both design and adaptation, in this context, presuppose that 
living things have the life-goals of reproductive success.  But Dawkins does not make this point. 
 Nor does he assert, much less emphasize, that the fundamental problem addressed by 
Darwinian theory is: How and why have the diverse purposive beings, that living things are, 
evolved in an ultimately purposeless universe? 
16. This is similar to, but not precisely the same as, the Baldwin effect, discussed by Dennett 
(1996), 77-80.  Dennett does not take into account that the dog-like creature may learn to catch 
fish from its parents by imitation. 
17. I am here, in the interests of clarity, contracting to a two-step change what would, in reality, 
be a many-step change, gradual changes in behaviour across generations being interwoven with 
a number of small changes in physiology being brought about by a number of mutations in 
successive generations: the basic point remains valid in the more complicated, realistic process 
of evolution. 
18. For a marvellous account of the way in which learnt behaviour can affect subsequent 
evolution, along the lines indicated here, see Hardy (1965). 
19. Darwin begins the great argument for his theory, in The Origin of Species, with a discussion 
of our breeding of animals.  (The chapter is called "Variation under Domestication".)  Breeding 
has sometimes been interpreted as amounting to no more than a sort of metaphor for natural 
selection: what we do, consciously, namely select those offspring with characteristics we prize, 
Nature does "blindly", in selecting those offspring best able to survive and reproduce.  But what 
I am arguing is that there is much more to it than this; unintended, unconscious breeding of 
living things by living things is an all-pervasive feature of evolution.  It is one which we can 
only do proper justice to if we acknowledge the role that purposive explanation plays in 
evolution and biology  -  where purposiveness is understood in its compatibilist, non-
Aristotelian sense.  When we intentionally and consciously breed animals we are modifying and 
developing an activity that is a long-standing, pervasive and highly significant feature of 
evolution, namely the tendency of all living things, unintentionally and unconsciously, to breed 
both their own species and other species.  The (historical) explanation for our existence as 
purposive beings must include this tendency of life to breed itself (unintentionally) into 
existence. 
20. Dawkins, famously, has argued that "the fundamental unit of selection" is not "the 
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individual" but "the gene, the unit of heredity" (Dawkins, 1978, 12).  One might perhaps say that 
Dawkins' view is that what is selected for are genes good at reproducing themselves, even 
though selection acts on living things produced, in part, by genes.  But however one decides the 
debate as to whether the unit of selection is the gene or the individual, one thing is clear: the 
fundamental task of Darwinian theory is to explain the existence and evolution of living things, 
purposive life (and not genes).  It would be peculiar indeed to hold that what fundamentally 
needs to be explained is the existence in the world of long strings of DNA molecules  -  
explaining the characteristics of living things being but a means to that end.  "The unit of 
selection" should not be conflated with "what Darwinian theory is fundamentally about and 
seeks to help explain". 
21. None of these disanalogies is quite conclusive.  Thus the distinction between genome and 
phenotype would not arise for the earliest forms of life; lines of descent, having separated, do 
sometimes subsequently merge in the biological world, as the existence of mitochondria in our 
cells indicate.  (Mitochondria, at one stage distinct life forms were, at some stage, absorbed into 
the ancestors of our cells.)  From the perspective of this book, the real objection to seeing 
memes as entities that undergo Darwinian evolution is that memes are not purposive things, and 
Darwinian theory is restricted to things that are purposive.  But this objection presupposes what 
I am trying to establish. 
22. What Holdcroft and Lewis are criticizing, of course, is not any account of the evolution of 
culture, but any Darwinian account which takes elements of culture as the things that undergo 
Darwinian evolution.  (To this I would add that any history of culture should always be pursued 
as the history of an aspect of life, life being what is fundamental, and culture being an aspect of 
(some) life: see note 23.)  
23. In ch. 9, and at greater length in Maxwell (1984), I argue for a kind of inquiry that gives 
intellectual priority to life and the problems of living, and has, as its basic aim, to promote 
wisdom.  From this perspective, the superiority of interpreting Darwinism as being, 
fundamentally, about evolving purposive (and eventually personalistic) life is at once apparent.  
24. That "cultural evolution" is quasi-Lamarckian in character has often been pointed out: see, 
for example, Boyd and Richerson (1985, 8) and Dennett (1991, 355).  But these authors are 
making a point rather different from the one I make when I assert that cultural evolution is 
Lamarckian in character, because for these authors "cultural evolution" means "the evolution of 
culture" and not, as for me, "evolution by cultural plus genetic mechanisms".  Dennett makes 
this point quite explicitly as follows: "Usually the 'charge' that cultural evolution is Lamarckian 
is a deep confusion ... [but when] it is undeniable ... the entity that exhibits the Lamarckian 
talent of passing on an acquired characteristic is not the human agent, but the meme itself" 
(Dennett, 1996, 355, n. 6). 
25. For excellent accounts of the origins and evolution of language see Dunbar (1997) and 
Deacon (1998). 
26. It is unlikely that this process (of cultural evolution creating the circumstances necessary for 
subsequent mutations to lead to genetic evolution) is confined to the evolution of human beings. 
 It can occur whenever animals are able to learn individually, and learn by imitation.  The 
(hypothetical) example, given above, of a dog-like creature evolving into a beaver-like creature 
as a result, in part, of the prior discovery that fish can be caught and are good to eat, is an 
example of cultural evolution making possible subsequent genetic evolution.  The dog-like 
creatures learn to catch fish as a result of individual learning and imitation: this change in the 
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way of life is pure cultural evolution.  It is, however, a necessary first step in the subsequent 
evolution into the beaver-like creature: flipper-producing mutations would not lead to beaver-
like creatures without the prior occurrence of the cultural evolution towards fish-catching dog-
like creatures. 
27. For a rather different account of various stages of evolution, see: Maynard Smith and 
Szathmary (1995). 
28. See Wooldridge (1963), 82-83. 
29. Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" needs to be replaced by Tolstoy's "I desire, therefore I 
am". 
30. See Kohler (1927). 
31. Grice (1957), reprinted in Grice (1989), ch. 14.  Grice makes no attempt, however, to 
indicate, as I have done here, the manner in which the multi-layered character of human 
communication can be seen as having emerged gradually as a result of Darwinian evolution. 
32. The speculative account of the evolution of sentience, consciousness and free will just 
indicated is a development of the account first given by me in Maxwell (1984), 174-181 and 
267-275: see also Maxwell (1985).  What I have done is to show how it is possible for neo-
Darwinism, when appropriately reinterpreted, to explain the evolution of purposiveness, 
sentience, consciousness, meaning, personalistic understanding, and free will.  
33. This theme is developed further in Maxwell (1984), and in chapter 9 of the present book.  
See also Pinker (1998), ch. 6-8. 
34. As I have already remarked, "Involving purposive activity" must be distinguished from 
"being purposeful".  That the mechanism of evolution "involves purposive activity" (the 
explanation for an evolutionary change exploiting some purposive explanation) does not mean 
at all that the mechanism in question is, overall, purposive in character.  "Involving purposive 
activity" comes in finely graded degrees; it is only when many of these degrees are added 
together that one has a mechanism of evolutionary change that is fully purposive in character. 
35. Dawkins (1978), 206-215. 
